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 EX ANTE ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF LABOR 
INTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS IN LIBERIA 
 
Clarence Tsimpo, Quentin Wodon and Errol Graham1 
 
Apart from fiscal measures, another initiative taken by the government of Liberia to 
respond to the economic crisis consisted in the launch of a cash for work temporary 
employment program.  This part of the study consists of three chapters devoted to the 
analysis of the program.  First, in this chapter which was written before the program was 
actually implemented, we provide an ex ante analysis of the potential impact of such a 
program, relying on simulation techniques rather than on impact evaluation.  The 
approach is very simple.  We assess who may be potentially interested in participating in 
the public works program by identifying working individuals without pay, as well as for 
every level of proposed wage in the public works, those individuals who work but now 
earn less than the public works wage, since all these individuals may indeed be interested 
in participating in the program to increase their earnings.  We also consider as potential 
beneficiaries the unemployed whose reservation wage is below the proposed public 
works wage.  Next, we randomly select among the pool of potential beneficiaries of the 
program a number of participants.  Finally, we estimate for the assumed participants to 
the program two key parameters which affect the potential impact of the program on the 
poor: the targeting performance of the program, and the substitution effect of the 
program, whereby only part of the wages paid to beneficiaries generate additional 
income, because at least some of the beneficiaries would probably have done other work 
if they had not participated in the program. The results suggest that such a cash for work 
program could be well targeted, but that this is by no means assured ex ante. 
 
1. Introduction 
Youth unemployment and underemployment is a major issue in sub-Saharan Africa as in 
many other areas of the developing world (World Bank, 2007a).  In many African countries, 
children and youth represent up to 40 percent of the population.  Thanks to programs such as the 
Education for All initiative, school enrolment rates are rapidly increasing, but many youth remain 
out of school, and are often without work or with work that do not build their skills2.   
As discussed among others in World Bank (2009) and Backiny-Yetna et al. (2011), 
Liberia is amongst the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of less than US$200, 
64 percent of the population in poverty and nearly 48 percent in extreme poverty. Poverty is 
especially high in rural areas but is also widespread in urban areas.  Liberia’s labor force is 
growing rapidly due to population growth, and is for the most part unskilled due to 14 years of 
civil conflict. The supply of workers in the economy exceeds by a substantial margin the existing 
demand for workers. Due to the combined effect of unemployment, underemployment, and low 
productivity work for many workers, the number one priority for the government in the opinion 
of the population should be to create employment. 
The Government of Liberia has outlined a Poverty Reduction Strategy that articulates the 
country’s vision and major strategies for moving towards rapid, inclusive and sustainable growth 
                                                 
1 The authors are with the World Bank.  This chapter was prepared in part as a background paper for a 
World Bank report on Employment and Pro-Poor Growth Liberia, and presented in Monrovia among 
others at a workshop in March 2011.  The views expressed here are those of the authors and need not 
reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent.  
2 On skills training in Africa, see Adams (2007), Haan and Serriere (2002), Johanson and Adams (2004) 
and Rosholm, Nielsen and Dabalen (2007).  
 and development during the period 2008-2011 (Republic of Liberia, 2008). The Government has 
indicated that growth will be private sector-led, while the government will focus on reforming 
public sector institutions and processes to facilitate investment and strengthen market functions. 
Yet the Liberian economy’s ability to create jobs in the short-to-medium-term has been adversely 
impacted by the confluence of the three global crises—the food crisis, the financial crisis and the 
commodity crisis. The crises have further compressed fiscal space, thereby limiting the 
government’s ability to respond with counter-cyclical fiscal policy. In line with this agenda, an as 
a response to the global crises, the Government of Liberia is implementing a labor intensive 
program.  
The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines employment-intensive or labor-
intensive projects as those projects where labor is the dominant resource. When considering labor 
intensive public works to build infrastructure, a first question for policy makers is whether using 
this type of programs has a negative impact on the infrastructure built, as opposed to using 
equipment–intensive techniques.  Over time, the provision of infrastructure in many countries has 
shifted from being predominantly labor-based to equipment-based. This shift has been 
particularly dramatic for developed countries where wage rates have been increasing. However, 
the shift is also taking place in some developing countries. Nevertheless, work done by the World 
Bank and the ILO has shown that for countries which are facing strong demand for infrastructure 
in the face of significant unemployment, labor-based provision of infrastructure remains a viable 
alternative to equipment-based provision of infrastructure. 
Labor-intensive employment programs including public works can help Liberia not only 
to rebuild social and economic assets quickly, but they could also buy crucial time until the 
private sector expands, and the diversification strategy takes root to allow the economy to absorb 
a larger proportion of the labor force at reasonable wages. Labor-intensive programs should not 
be seen as a single “silver bullet” but as one of the elements of a comprehensive strategy which 
has short-term, medium-term and long-term elements to address the issue of the lack of gainful 
employment in Liberia.  At the same time, labor-intensive public works have advantage over 
other strategies for infrastructure building and employment creation in Liberia. 
Cross country experience with labor-intensive initiatives shows that the welfare impacts 
have generally been positive but the results have been mixed in terms of the quality and 
sustainability of the assets produced. Public employment programs were pioneered in South Asia 
to deal with huge open unemployment. The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MEGS) is known as an effective safety net for the poor in India. Bangladesh has used public 
employment programs since 1962, largely financed by external donors. In Sri Lanka, labor-
intensive public works was used to cushion the adverse effects of structural adjustments. In Latin 
America, the outcome is equally positive. According to Subbarao (2003), nearly 100 percent of 
the participants in Chile’s public works program belonged to poor households. In Argentina’s 
Trabajar program, 60 to 70 percent of households participating were poor. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, labor-intensive public works programs have been implemented both as free-standing 
programs as well as components of Social Fund programs. In general, stakeholders’ views have 
been positive on the income and the capacity building impact of these programs. Stakeholders 
were particularly please at the speed with which the jobs were created although they were 
temporary.  The public work program in South Africa, which is considered to be one of the most 
innovative, has multiple objectives including job creation, poverty reduction, infrastructure 
development, job training and community capacity building (Adato and Haddad, 2001). 
What the cross-country experiences show is that projects or programs in support of labor-
intensive work focus on a range of assets including roads (mostly rural but also urban), markets, 
schools, health centers, urban drainage systems, water supply systems, irrigation systems, 
reforestation, anti-erosion structures, land reclamation, housing, and solid waste management. 
Roads tend to be the most popular asset of choice for labor-intensive public works program 
across the world. Whichever assets are chosen, a critical success factor in the implementation and 
 sustainability of the project is the ownership by the communities. The cross-country experience 
clearly shows that those assets which are demand driven and reflect the choice of the 
communities are more likely to be better implemented and are more sustainable that those assets 
which are supply driven, even when the communities benefit from the jobs that are created.  
Social Funds have been successful at encouraging community participation. They have used 
different participatory tools to get communities involved in deciding priority projects, their 
location, design supervision of implementation and the maintenance of the projects. There has 
also been recent successful experimentation with community contracting (for example: the 
Jamaica Social Investment Fund, the Malawi Social Action Fund and Bolivia Social Fund). 
Beneficiary participation not only builds ownership of project but it is also an essential 
component of good governance.   
The launch of a public works program in Liberia may appear to be a sound idea in order 
to help youth find employment and improve their skills.  Indeed, according to lessons from a 
Youth Employment Inventory of 289 programs and interventions from 84 countries recently 
carried out by the World Bank (2007b), public works and training program are more suitable than 
formal sector wage subsidy programs for youth in developing countries, since wage subsidies do 
not go far in developing countries due to the small size of the formal wage sector and also do not 
reach the poor.  Public works and training programs are also more likely to succeed than targeted 
youth entrepreneurship schemes.  This is because while these schemes may improve opportunities 
for young entrepreneurs in low-income countries where job growth in the formal economy tends 
to be rare, the evidence indicates that not all youth will be well suited for self-employment and 
that failures rates for young entrepreneurs can be high.   
However, careful targeting and screening for these programs is important to success and 
cost-effectiveness, and it may well be that training programs are substantially more expensive 
than public works program, especially if the training programs target relatively better educated 
workers and pay a high wage for the period of training.  Training programs are also more 
successful when they involve the private sector in providing practical work experience and in 
identifying the kind of skills required.  Engagement of the private sector in training is an effective 
tool to mitigate the risk of high-cost training disconnected from market demand and to increase 
on-the-job training. 
In this chapter, which was originally written before the implementation of Liberia’s cash 
for work temporary employment project, our objective was to provide some policy guidance to 
the Government of Liberia in its development of a more strategic approach towards achieving its 
pro-poor growth objectives and specifically in implementing a public works program.  To provide 
a preliminary assessment of the potential impact of a public works program on poverty (on the 
impact of public works on poverty in developing countries, see among others Ravallion, 1999), 
we rely in this chapter on simulation techniques rather than on impact evaluation techniques.  The 
approach is very simple.  We assess who may be potentially interested in participating in the 
public works program by identifying working individuals without pay, as well as for every level 
of proposed wage in the public works, those individuals who work but now earn less than the 
public works wage, since all these individuals may indeed be interested in participating in the 
program to increase their earnings.  We also consider as potential beneficiaries the unemployed 
whose reservation wage is below the proposed public works wage.  Next, we randomly select 
among the pool of potential beneficiaries of the program a number of participants.  Finally, we 
estimate for the assumed participants to the program two key parameters which affect the 
potential impact of the program on the poor: the targeting performance of the program, and the 
substitution effect of the program, whereby only part of the wages paid to beneficiaries generate 
additional income, because at least some of the beneficiaries would probably have done other 
work if they had not participated in the program.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, using recent household survey data we 
provide data on the potential demand for public works programs by looking at the number of 
 youths who are either not working but willing to work (the unemployed), or are working but with 
a level of pay that is below what the program provides.  In section 3, we simulate the potential 
impact on poverty of the program through the payment of wages to the participating youths (we 
deliberately do not consider the additional impact which may come from the training component 
of the program since we do not have data to estimate its impact).  The simulations take into 
account the likely targeting performance of the program, as well as the likely substitution effects.  
A conclusion follows. 
 
2. Potential Demand for employment programs 
To provide an assessment of the potential impact of labor-intensive public works on 
poverty in Liberia, we rely on simulation techniques using the 2007 CWIQ survey.  In a similar 
way to Coulombe et al. (2008), the approach begins with an assessment of who may be 
potentially interested in participating in the program by identifying working individuals without 
pay, as well as for every level of the proposed wage in the program, those individuals who work 
but now earns less than the program wage, since all these individuals may indeed be interested in 
participating in the program to increase their earnings. The unemployed whose reservation wage 
is likely to be below the proposed program wage are also considered as potential beneficiaries. 
Next, we randomly select among the pool of potential beneficiaries of the program a number of 
participants. Finally, we estimate for the assumed participants in the program a leakage rate 
which represents the share of program outlays that do not directly contribute to poverty reduction.  
This leakage rate depends on two key parameters: (i) the targeting performance of the program, 
and (ii) the substitution effect of the program, whereby only part of the wages paid to 
beneficiaries generates additional income, because beneficiaries would probably have done other 
work if they had not participated in the program.  Our simulations for the impact of public works 
on poverty are based on the assumption of a 50 percent substitution effect, so that program 
participants give up half their current earnings to participate in the public works program which is 
assumed to take place in the lean season (this may be a high substitution effect given lack of 
gainful employment in Liberia).   
Using the 2007 Liberia CWIQ Survey, we provide in this section estimates of the number 
of youths aged 20 to 40 who could be interested by a national youth employment program.   An 
analysis of the 2007 CWIQ data suggests that only a small share (less than 10 percent) of the 
population is likely to earn more than the minimum wage, which is US$2/day, or US$480/year.  
While this suggests that the targeting of public works programs would be better if wages are set 
lower than the minimum wage, this may not be socially and legally defensible. Therefore we 
consider three wage levels for the simulations: US$240, US$480 and US$720.  These wages are 
annualized.  We assume that public works participants will benefit from the program for six 
months per year.   
 The 2007 Liberia CWIQ Survey did not collect the information on individual wages.  
Instead, the income section considered wages for the household as a hole.  Given the absence of 
individual data on wages, some assumption has to be made in order to estimate the actual wage of 
individual and to derive the reservation wage for those unemployed. For each household, the 
overall household wage is divided by the number wage earner to compute the individual wage.  
Then, a regression model was estimated to impute the reservation wage for the unemployed. 
Figure 1 gives the distributions of both the actual and the estimated wage. These estimates of 
wages are critical for the current assessment. 
Tables 5 provide data on the distribution of earnings of individuals who are already 
working, as well as on the distribution of the imputed reservation wage for individuals who are 
unemployed and looking for work.  The groups of individuals are presented in the first column of 
the table in terms of their annual wages in US Dollar.  Table 5 enables us assess the potential 
population that could be interested in a job in a public works program without eligibility 
condition in terms of education, gender, etc.  
 Consider first the statistics provided in table 5.  We see for example that there is a very 
large group of youth who are working but are paid less than half of the minimum wage (52 
percent of the youths who are working at the national level are paid less than US$240/year).  
These individuals are likely to be interested in public works.  Clearly, some may not apply for 
such a program due to various constraints (they may not be paid, but still doing important work 
that has to be done for their household, and hence they may not be able to participate in the 
program).  Also, depending on the wage paid by public works, additional individuals could be 
interested in participating in the program if their current wage is below that proposed by the 
program.  We cannot identify those who would actually be interested and those who would not.  
But for the purpose of the simulations in the next section, all the individuals unpaid for their 
work, as well as all individuals who earn less than the proposed wage are potential beneficiaries 
of the program, and we can randomly chose some of these individuals as participants in public 
works for each proposed wage level in order to simulate the impact of the program on poverty.  
Finally, among the unemployed, those who have a reservation wage below the proposed wage 
would also be potential beneficiaries. 
 The estimates in table 5 therefore give us an upper bound for the potential number of 
youths that might be interested in a public works program, depending on the wage provided in the 
program, and without any eligibility condition as it may be proxied by the gender, the education 
level or other individual characteristic.  Figures 2 to 4 summarize the data on the potential 
number of participants by quintiles of per capita consumption of the households to whom the 
individuals who are potential beneficiaries belong.  This is done for three potential wage levels, 
from US$240 per year to US$720 per year.   
Two findings stand out from the results presented in Figure 2 to 4. First, the number of 
individuals who could potentially be interested in the program appears to be very large, especially 
because many workers are working with low pay (observed or imputed) and might therefore be 
interested in getting higher cash income through public works. Second, the targeting performance 
or likely benefit incidence of the program depends on whether the program is implemented 
mostly in urban or rural areas. In urban areas, the program would probably be regressive, since 
most of the potential beneficiaries belong to the better off quintiles of the population (this is 
because urban households tend to have higher levels of consumption than rural households, so 
that relatively few households in urban areas belong to the bottom quintiles).  By contrast, the 
programs could be well targeted to individuals belonging to households which tend to be poor if 
the focus is placed on providing employment and reconstructing infrastructure in rural areas.  
There is also a clear relationship between the wage level of workers and the poverty status of 
households.   
 
  
 Figure 7.1: Distribution of actual wage and imputed wage, Liberia 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data.  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
De
ns
ity
Log of Annual Wage (US $) 
Actual Wages Imputeed Wages - Employed Imputeed Wages - Unemployed Minimum Waqe Only one Employed
 Table 7.1: Potential Beneficiaries of Publics Works among individuals aged 20-40, National, 
2007 
 Wage of workers 
  
  
  
Unemployed reservation wage 
 
  % #people Annual  Weekly % % #people Imputed Annual  Weekly % 
 Group Group Wage Hours Poor Group Group Wage Hours Poor 
Liberia             
< $42 5.6 32377.7 1299.7 45.2 73.2 - - - - - 
$42 - $70 2.5 14513.8 4065.6 50.3 60.2 0.2 129.7 4687.2 - 100.0 
$70 - $98 3.7 21253.4 6133.8 47.1 79.7 3.7 2976.8 6418.5 - 70.0 
$98 - $140 9.8 57138.7 8718.1 40.2 67.2 10.3 8346.2 8680.1 - 59.0 
$140 - $210 31.3 181690.0 12542.0 43.8 65.4 31.3 25361.8 12645.7 - 64.4 
$210 - $280 20.9 121557.0 17298.4 46.9 60.9 31.6 25611.7 17232.3 - 64.7 
$280 - $350 7.9 45818.3 22085.9 48.7 59.4 16.1 13023.0 22281.9 - 58.7 
$350 - $420 4.2 24594.4 27299.4 45.2 58.3 3.6 2918.0 26449.2 - 71.6 
$420 - $490 2.6 14947.0 32710.8 46.4 39.1 2.4 1930.0 32322.3 - 36.6 
$490 - $560 2.5 14284.1 36989.1 51.2 57.2 0.2 147.8 35300.8 - 100.0 
$560+ 9.1 52966.0 84797.8 49.0 28.7 0.7 560.0 43864.2 - 42.7 
Total Liberia 100.0 581140.0 21170.7 45.6 60.5 100.0 81004.8 16218.1 - 62.8 
Urban             
< $42 10.0 15180.8 1073.7 42.6 56.7 - - - - - 
$42 - $70 4.3 6549.9 4177.0 54.3 51.3 0.3 129.7 4687.2 - 100.0 
$70 - $98 7.2 10934.8 6210.3 45.9 75.3 6.3 2844.3 6408.0 - 68.6 
$98 - $140 7.9 11978.5 8590.9 45.9 65.4 11.6 5250.7 8554.7 - 64.9 
$140 - $210 14.3 21755.6 12967.1 45.6 47.8 16.6 7521.1 13092.7 - 71.6 
$210 - $280 16.3 24687.8 17471.7 43.9 51.3 31.8 14361.2 17431.6 - 60.3 
$280 - $350 8.6 13060.1 22407.1 46.9 41.8 22.3 10100.5 22361.1 - 50.1 
$350 - $420 5.5 8350.6 27383.2 47.1 39.1 5.6 2546.7 26523.1 - 68.5 
$420 - $490 4.0 6130.0 32673.7 47.5 36.9 3.9 1761.7 32229.9 - 40.1 
$490 - $560 2.8 4182.8 37542.8 50.9 38.0 0.3 147.8 35300.8 - 100.0 
$560+ 19.1 28967.2 101128.6 51.0 21.6 1.2 560.0 43864.2 - 42.7 
Total Urban 100.0 151778.0 31203.2 46.9 46.1 100.0 45223.6 17524.6 - 60.7 
Rural             
< $42 4.0 17196.9 1499.3 47.5 87.8 - - - - - 
$42 - $70 1.9 7963.9 3974.1 47.1 67.6 - - - - - 
$70 - $98 2.4 10318.6 6052.6 48.4 84.3 0.4 132.4 6643.9 - 100.0 
$98 - $140 10.5 45160.3 8751.8 38.7 67.7 8.7 3095.5 8893.0 - 49.0 
$140 - $210 37.2 159934.0 12484.2 43.6 67.8 49.9 17840.7 12457.3 - 61.3 
$210 - $280 22.6 96868.9 17254.3 47.7 63.3 31.4 11250.4 16977.9 - 70.3 
$280 - $350 7.6 32758.2 21957.9 49.4 66.5 8.2 2922.5 22008.5 - 88.5 
$350 - $420 3.8 16243.8 27256.3 44.2 68.2 1.0 371.3 25941.7 - 92.6 
$420 - $490 2.1 8817.0 32736.5 45.5 40.5 0.5 168.4 33289.5 - 0.0 
$490 - $560 2.4 10101.4 36759.8 51.3 65.2 - - - - - 
$560+ 5.6 23998.8 65086.0 46.6 37.2 - - - - - 
Total Rural 100.0 429362.0 17624.2 45.2 65.6 100.0 35781.2 14566.9 - 65.5 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 
 Figure 7.2: Distribution of potential beneficiaries of public works, National 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 
Figure 7.3: Distribution of potential beneficiaries of public works, Urban 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
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 Figure 7.4: Distribution of potential beneficiaries of Public Works, Rural 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 
4. Potential Poverty Impact of Public Works  
The cost of a public works program would depend on the number of beneficiaries and the 
wages paid to program participants.  An analysis of the 2007 CWIQ data suggests that only a 
small share (less than 10 percent) of the population is likely to earn more than the minimum 
wage, which is US$2/day, or US$480/year.  While this suggests that the targeting of public works 
programs would be better if wages are set lower than the minimum wage, this may not be socially 
and legally defensible. Therefore we consider three wage levels for the simulations: US$240, 
US$480 and US$720.  These wages are annualized.  We assume that public works participants 
will benefit from the program for six months per year.  Table 6 provides simple estimates of the 
potential cost of the program under three scenarios for the number of beneficiaries. Under the first 
scenario, the program would reach 50,000 beneficiaries, and its cost would then range from 
US$6.9 million (0.8 percent of GDP) assuming program wages of US$240 per year or about half 
the minimum wage, to US$20.7 million (2.3 percent of GDP) assuming program wages of 
US$720 or about 150 percent of the minimum wage. Under a second scenario, the program would 
reach 100,000 beneficiaries at a cost ranging from US$13.8 million (1.5 percent of GDP) to 
US$41.4 million (4.6 percent of GDP). These costs include wage cost and administrative costs, 
but do not cover the other costs of public works in terms of materials for construction purposes. 
In order to assess the potential impact of the public works program, on the basis of the 
numbers of jobs created, we randomly select among all potential beneficiaries of the program (the 
number of which depends on the wage provided) a number of participants so as to match the 
distribution of the actual program participants.  This is done for each of the wages assumed to be 
provided.  The results of this procedure and the related statistics on targeting performance are 
provided in table 7 for poverty headcount and table 8 for extreme poverty headcount. 
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 Consider first table 7 which provides data for public works program potential participants 
given the poverty headcount.  The first column provides the estimate of the total number of 
potential beneficiaries of the program depending on the wage level, as estimated from table 5.  
For example, at a wage level of US$240/year, 165,281 individuals in the North Central region 
might be potential beneficiaries of public works according to our method for identifying such 
potential beneficiaries.  The second column provides the share of those individuals living in 
households who are poor.  For example, at a wage of US$240/year, 68.9 percent of the potential 
beneficiaries in the North Central region live in a household in poverty according to the definition 
of poverty used by the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (see Backiny-
Yetna and al., 2011).  The third column provides the additional wage to be obtained by each 
individual, on average, depending on the wage proposed for the program.  At a wage of 
US$240/year, out of that amount, on average US$73.6 represents additional income for potential 
participants to the program in the North Central region.   
The next column provides the leakage rate, which is computed as the product of the 
poverty rate times the additional wage divided by the reference wage of the program.  The 
leakage rate represents the share of program outlays that do not directly contribute to poverty 
reduction.  This leakage rate depends on two key parameters: (i) the targeting performance of the 
program, and (ii) the substitution effect of the program, whereby only part of the wages paid to 
beneficiaries generates additional income, because beneficiaries would probably have done other 
work if they had not participated in the program.   
If the public works program is implemented with an annual wage of US720, the leakage 
rate for poverty is estimated in Monrovia at 58.0 percent, and for extreme poverty the estimate is 
at 80.2 percent.  These are relatively high leakage rates because the share of those participating in 
the public works program that are poor or extreme poor is lower in the capital than elsewhere. 
Overall, however, the variation in leakage rates between the various wage levels is not very high.  
This is because a higher wage levels implies less targeting to the poor, but on the other hand it 
reduces the substitution effect through which part of the gains from the public works wage are 
lost due to the need to give up other work.  In terms of results for the country as a whole, at a 
wage rate of US$240 per year, the overall leakage rate is 52.4 percent, and it remains between 
45.4 percent and 52.4 percent when we change the wage rate.  However, as already mentioned, 
the leakage rate is systematically higher in Monrovia than elsewhere, because the share of 
participants in the program that are poor or extreme poor is lower in the capital.  In contrast, the 
leakage rates are lowest in the South eastern area of the country, where poverty and extreme 
poverty are higher. 
 
Table 7.2: Estimates of project cost (wages and administrative costs), 2007 
Parameters Scenario I Scenario II 
Beneficiaries 50,000 50,000 50,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
Min. Wage (US$) ----480---- 
Paid wage (US$) 240 480 720 240 480 720 
% minimum wage 50% 100% 150% 50% 100% 150% 
Employment duration ---6 Months--- 
Cost (US$M) 6 12 18 12 24 36 
Adm. cost 15% 0.9 1.8 2.7 1.8 3.6 5.4 
Total cost (US$M) 6.9 13.8 20.7 13.8 27.6 41.4 
Cost/GDP (%) 0.8% 1.5% 2.3% 1.5% 3.1% 4.6% 
GDP (US$M) 904.35 904.35 904.35 904.35 904.35 904.35 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 Table 7.3: Potential leakage of Public Works for Poverty Headcount, 2007 
    
Part time and partial 
substitution 
Full time and full 
substitution 
 Region #of people 
Poverty 
Headcount in% 
Additional 
Wage In 
US $ 
yearly 
Leakage 
Rate in% 
Additional 
Wage In 
US $ 
yearly 
Leakage 
Rate in% 
$240 Greater Monrovia 37,331 50.9 79.6 60.8 108.5 72.5 
 North Central 165,281 68.9 73.6 51.5 84.3 72.0 
 North Western 27,198 74.2 66.0 53.1 54.0 80.5 
 South Central 71,549 63.4 78.4 52.0 103.8 67.4 
 South Eastern A 24,242 78.9 72.4 45.5 79.4 69.9 
 South Eastern B 17,652 68.6 70.5 52.8 72.1 74.3 
 Total 343,252 66.9 74.4 52.4 87.6 71.7 
$480 Greater Monrovia 101,082 49.9 173.9 57.9 275.7 65.6 
 North Central 229,512 67.9 168.6 45.5 254.4 58.8 
 North Western 61,478 73.7 158.4 44.4 213.5 62.4 
 South Central 87,877 58.9 176.6 49.4 286.3 57.7 
 South Eastern A 54,203 74.4 163.6 41.2 234.2 56.9 
 South Eastern B 42,298 67.3 164.8 46.1 239.2 59.5 
 Total 576,450 64.5 168.9 47.8 255.6 60.1 
$720 Greater Monrovia 114,643 47.6 270.9 58.0 453.8 63.7 
 North Central 241,544 67.2 269.3 42.3 447.3 51.9 
 North Western 63,901 73.0 260.6 39.4 412.3 51.8 
 South Central 93,311 57.7 276.3 48.4 475.3 54.5 
 South Eastern A 57,130 74.1 264.3 37.2 427.1 48.6 
 South Eastern B 44,696 66.8 266.0 42.9 434.1 52.7 
 Total 615,224 63.3 269.1 45.4 446.3 54.2 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 
Table 7.4: Potential leakage of Public Works for Ext. Poverty Headcount, 2007 
  
      Part time and partial substitution 
Full time and full 
substitution 
  
Region #of people 
Ext. Poverty 
Headcount 
in% 
Additional 
Wage In US 
$ yearly 
Leakage 
Rate in% 
Additional 
Wage In US 
$ yearly 
Leakage 
Rate in% 
$240  Greater Monrovia 37,331 24.5 79.6 81.1 108.5 86.6 
 North Central 165,281 57.2 73.6 59.9 84.3 77.0 
 North Western 27,198 59.9 66.0 62.2 54.0 84.4 
 South Central 71,549 45.8 78.4 65.7 103.8 77.1 
 South Eastern A 24,242 61.3 72.4 58.0 79.4 77.4 
  South Eastern B 17,652 53.5 70.5 63.8 72.1 81.2 
  Total 343,252 51.6 74.4 63.7 87.6 78.9 
$480  Greater Monrovia 101,082 24.1 173.9 80.1 275.7 84.2 
 North Central 229,512 55.0 168.6 55.5 254.4 66.1 
 North Western 61,478 59.1 158.4 55.4 213.5 69.8 
 South Central 87,877 41.2 176.6 64.5 286.3 70.1 
 South Eastern A 54,203 58.9 163.6 53.2 234.2 65.4 
  South Eastern B 42,298 51.4 164.8 58.5 239.2 68.5 
  Total 576,450 48.0 168.9 61.2 255.6 70.4 
$720  Greater Monrovia 114,643 22.6 270.9 80.2 453.8 83.0 
 North Central 241,544 54.5 269.3 53.1 447.3 60.7 
 North Western 63,901 58.1 260.6 51.6 412.3 61.4 
 South Central 93,311 40.2 276.3 63.9 475.3 68.0 
 South Eastern A 57,130 58.0 264.3 50.5 427.1 59.1 
  South Eastern B 44,696 51.1 266.0 56.2 434.1 63.5 
  Total 615,224 46.8 269.1 59.6 446.3 66.1 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 
  
 The estimated potential impact of the program on poverty is given in table 9.  The 
estimates are obtained in a very simple way.  For the participants in the program who belong to 
households living in poverty, we add to the consumption aggregate of the household the gains in 
earnings obtained by the participants, and we recomputed poverty using the same poverty lines 
(for a discussion of poverty measurement in Liberia, see Backiny-Yetna and al, 2011).  In other 
words, we assume that the full amount of the earnings gains for program participants translate 
into additional consumption for their households.  Our simulations for the impact of public works 
on poverty are based on the assumption of a 50 percent substitution effect, so that program 
participants give up half their current earnings to participate in the public works program which is 
assumed to take place in the lean season.  For higher wages, the impact is higher, since the 
additional earnings obtained by participants are higher.   
With the provision of 50,000 jobs and assuming annual public works wage of US$720 
(each workers then gets US$360 over a six month period) the headcount index of poverty is 
reduced by 15.6 percentage points among program beneficiaries. The reduction in the headcount 
for the population as a whole is 1.61 percentage point.  The impact on extreme poverty is similar.  
While a reduction in the headcount index of poverty of less than two percentage points may not 
appear to be very large as compared to the existing share of the population in poverty (at 64 
percent), this is still not negligible and a large share of the population would benefit from 
improvements in standards of living through the public works program.  When 100,000 jobs are 
created, the impact on poverty is about twice that of the impact with 50,000 jobs 
 
Table 7.5: Potential impact of public works for the reduction of poverty, National, 2007 
 Beneficiaries Whole population 
 Headcount Poverty Gap Headcount Poverty Gap 
 Impact on poverty, 50,000 jobs 
$240 3.33 3.29 0.35 0.34 
$480 10.16 6.85 1.05 0.71 
$720 15.61 10.06 1.61 1.04 
 Impact on extreme poverty, 50,000 jobs 
$240 3.40 3.01 0.36 0.31 
$480 10.08 6.02 1.04 0.62 
$720 16.07 8.62 1.66 0.89 
Source: Authors’ estimation using 2007 CWIQ data. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Job creation is an imperative for the new Government of Liberia. Fourteen years of civil 
conflict has not only destroyed the social and economic infrastructure base but it has also 
grounded the economy to a virtual halt and has consequently resulted in large scale 
unemployment and significant poverty. Growth has picked up since the signing of the Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003, spurred in part by increasing foreign direct investment 
in traditional sectors. However, the current rate of job creation in these sectors, even under the 
most optimistic scenario, is unlikely to absorb a significant portion of the unemployed and 
underemployed labor force in the short-term. The lack of gainful employment, including for 
many unskilled youth (whose education was terminated by the conflict) as well as ex-combatants, 
poses a significant risk to maintaining peace. One of the major challenges facing the Government 
is to devise a strategic response to address the immediate employment situation in the context of 
establishing a strategic framework for more sustainable, long-term jobs created by the private 
sector. The strategy for job creation that is ultimately adopted by the Government should reflects 
its social, economic and political needs; its administrative capacity to manage the implementation 
of the strategy; and the viability of the strategy in terms of it financial and political sustainability 
given the current and evolving fiscal space and the political situation. 
 In terms of strategy options, labor-intensive public works appear to be the most natural fit 
to the current situation in Liberia. Labor-intensive public works can respond to the country’s dual 
needs to: (i) create social and economic assets to improve welfare and help create the 
environment for private sector led growth; and (ii) provide employment for a large number of 
unskilled workers including women and youth. Wage subsidy schemes may be less appropriate 
for the current situation in Liberia given the public and private sectors’ limited capacity to absorb 
additional labor in the short-term. Furthermore, targeted wage subsidy schemes are 
administratively more difficult to administer and generalized schemes would be more expensive. 
The opportunities for labor-intensive public urban and rural works cover rehabilitation or 
reconstruction of schools, health centers and other small civil works as well as the management of 
solid waste. Also on roads, low-volume community and feeder roads also lend themselves to 
labor-intensive works both for construction and maintenance. Some aspects of the maintenance of 
high volume, highway roads also lend themselves to labor-intensive operation. However, re-
construction of critical high-volume roads with machine surface finish, lend themselves less to 
labor-intensive operation. In any case, these are also the roads which need to be delivered quickly 
to crowd in private sector investment. Of the current road network of about 10,000 km, about half 
of which may be suitable for labor-intensive operation. 
The cost of a public works program in Liberia would vary greatly depending on its size 
and the wages paid.  For example, a program providing six months of employment to 50,000 
beneficiaries would cost from US$6.9 million (0.8 percent of GDP) with a very low public works 
wage of US$240 per year (or about half the minimum wage) to US$20.7 million (2.3 percent of 
GDP) with a wage of US$720 per year (or about 150 percent of the minimum wage). This cost 
includes wage costs and administrative costs, but not other costs in terms of materials for 
construction purposes.  A program with 50,000 jobs at an annual wage of US$720 would reduce 
the share of the population in poverty by about 15.6 percentage points among program 
beneficiaries and 1.61 point in the population as a whole.  The impact on extreme poverty is 
similar.  While this may not seem large, a large share of the population would benefit from 
improvements in standards of living through the program. 
Our simulation suggested that the number of individuals who could potentially be 
interested in the program appears to be very large, especially because many workers are working 
with low pay (observed or imputed) and might therefore be interested in getting higher cash 
income through public works.  The targeting performance or likely benefit incidence of the 
program depends on whether the program is implemented mostly in urban or rural areas. In urban 
areas, the program would probably be regressive, since most of the potential beneficiaries belong 
to the better off quintiles of the population (this is because urban households tend to have higher 
levels of consumption than rural households, so that relatively few households in urban areas 
belong to the bottom quintiles).  By contrast, the programs could be well targeted to individuals 
belonging to households which tend to be poor if the focus is placed on providing employment 
and reconstructing infrastructure in rural areas.  
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